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INJURED LAND-BASED VESSEL REPAIRMAN AWARDED SEAMAN STATUS UNDER
JONES ACT, BUT CANNOT RECOVER DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
CAUSED BY AWARENESS OF THE DEATH OF A RELATIVE IN THE SAME ACCIDENT

Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L . L . C .
744 F . 3 d 927
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
( Decided March 10, 2014)
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court
that evidence was sufficient to establish employee was a seaman entitled to Jones Act coverage
and that employer was negligent, but vacated judgment that employee's emotional damages
arising from the death of employee's relative in the same accident that injured employee were
compensable under the Jones Act, and remanded on damages issue.

Elevating Boats, L.L.C. ("EBI") produces, operates, and maintains a fleet of lift-boats 1 and
marine cranes in several Louisiana port Facilities. 2 EBI employed Larry Naquin, Sr. ("Naquin") as a
vessel repair supervisor, primarily tasked with the maintenance and repair of EBI ' s lift-boats, which
ordinarily required him to work aboard the l ift-boats while they were moored, jacked up, or docked in
3
the shipyard canal. Naquin would work while the vessel was being moved within the canal, and
4
occasionally on a vessel that was operating on open water. Naquin spent 70 percent of his total time
working aboard these vessels, spending the remaining 30 percent of his time working on land.5
On November 17, 2009, Naquin was operating the shipyard ' s land-based crane to move a
heavy iron weight that was within the crane's lifting capacity. 6 The crane suddenly failed, and toppled
7
over onto a nearby building. Naquin jumped from the crane house as it fel l, but not without injury. 8
Naquin' s cousin ' s husband, who had been working in the nearby bui lding, was crushed to death by the
crane. 9
Naquin brought a Jones Act suit in the District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
alleging that EBI was negligent in their "construction and/or maintenance of the [] land-based crane. " 10
The jury concluded that Naquin qualified as a Jones Act seaman and that he was injured as a result of
11
EBI's negligence. The jury awarded Naquin damages including past and future mental pain and
12
suffering. EBI appealed, contending : ( i ) that Naquin was not a Jones Act Seaman; (ii) that the

1

"A lift-boat is a self-propelled, self-elevating, offshore supply vessel. Although it functions and navigates much like any
other supply vessel, a typical lift-boat is equipped with three column-like legs that can be quickly lowered to the seafloor to
raise the vessel out of the water and stabilize it for marine operations." Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927,
930 n.l (2014).
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/d. Naquin suffered two broken feet and a lower abdominal hernia, requiring surgery and physical therapy.
/d. Naquin learned of his relative's death the next day in the hospital. !d.
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!d. The jury awarded $400,000 for future lost wages, $1 ,000,000 for past and future physical pain and suffering, and
$1,000,000 for past and future mental pain and suffering. !d.

evidence was insufficient to establish negligence; and (iii) that the district court erred by admitting
evidence to support Naquin's emotional damages c laim. 13
On appeal, EBI first argued that the jury erred in finding Naquin was a seaman entitled to Jones
Act coverage because Naquin was a land-based ship-repairman with no adequate connection to vessels
in navigation to qualify him as a seaman. 1 4 EBI argued that Naquin's duties c lassified him as a land
based worker, thereby invoking the protections of the Longshore and Harbor Worker's Compensation
Act and precluding coverage under the Jones Act. 1 5 To determine whether Naquin qualified as a
seaman, the Fifth Circuit applied the two-prong test set forth by the Supreme Court: "First, 'an
employee's duties must contribute to the function of the vessel or to the accomplishment of its
mission.' Second, 'a seaman must have a connection to a vessel in navigation (or to an identifiable
group of such vessels) that is substantial in terms of both duration and nature. ' " 1 6 The court
summarized the relevant inquiry as "whether, in the course of his current job, [Naquin] substantially
contribute[ d] to the vessels' functions and maintain[ ed] a substantial connection with the fleet." 17
The court found that the first prong of the test was easily satisfied, as Naquin did the ship's
work and contributed to the function of EBI's vessels. 1 8 In addressing the second prong of the test, the
court noted that the purpose of the substantial connection requirement is to separate sea-based
maritime employees entitled to Jones Act protection from land-based employees that " 'only have a
temporary or sporadic connection to a vessel in navigation, and therefore whose employment does not
regularly expose them to the perils of the sea.' "19 The court appl ied the Supreme Court's "rule of
thumb[] '[that] [a] worker who spends less than about 30 percent of his time in the service of a vessel
20
in navigation should not qualify as a seaman under the Jones Act.' " Accordingly, because Naquin
spent 70 percent of his time working on EBI' s fleet of lift-boats, the court held that the evidence
supported the jury's finding that Naquin had a substantial temporal connection to the E B I fleet. 2 1
In response to EBI's argument that Naquin was not "regularly exposed to the perils o f the sea,"
the court held that workers who spend time aboard vessels near the shore "stil l remain exposed to the
perils of a maritime work environment."22 The court analogized Naquin to the plaintiff in In re
Endeavor Marine23.24 There, a crane operator, working exclusively on a stationary barge used to load
and unload cargo at a Mississippi River dock facility, was found to be exposed to the perils of the
sea. 25 The court found similarly, Naquin's primary duties exposed him to "precisely the same type and
degree of maritime perils."26 Accordingly, the court found that Naquin "contribute[ d) to the function
of a discrete fleet of vessels and ha[ d] a connection with the fleet that [wa ]s substantial in terms of both
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!d. at 932.

!d.

1 5 !d. The court rejected this argument noting that in Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, the Supreme Court clarified that the
"Jones Act covers any worker who qualifies as a 'seaman,' without regard to whether a worker may also qualify for
coverage under the LHWCA." !d. (quoting Southwest Marine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81, 87-88 (1991)).
6
1 !d.at 933 (quoting Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 335 F.3d 376, 387 (5th Cir. 2003)).
17 /d.
18

/d. The court noted that "EBI concede[d), Naquin spent the majority of his time repairing, cleaning, painting, and
maintaining the 26-30 lift-boat vessels that EBI operated out of the [] shipyard." !d. Additionally, the remainder was spent
aboard the lift-boats operating marine cranes and securing the decks for voyage. !d. Therefore, the court held "such tasks
are necessary to the function and operation of any vessel." !d.
19
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!d.

/d.

3

234 F .3d 287 (5th Cir. 2000).
Naquin, 744 F.3d at 934-35.
2
5 Endeavor Marine, 234 F.3d at 289.
26
Naquin, 744 F.3d at 935.
24
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duration and nature."27 The court thereby held the evidence supported the j ury' s findings that
Naquin ' s connection to the EBI fleet was substantial in both nature and duration, and that Naquin was
a seaman under the Jones Act. 28
I n addressing EBI ' s second argument, that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury ' s
finding o f negligence, the court stated i t is clear that " [e ] very employer has a duty to provide its
employees with a reasonably safe work environment and work equipment."29 Testimony at trial
30
established that the crane, manufactured by EBI, fel l after a weld failed. Although Naquin could not
prove precisely why the weld failed, it was not disputed that EBI was the party responsible for the
design and inte?rity of the crane, and the jury relied on this circumstantial evidence to determine EBI
3
was negligent. EBI further argued that the exclusive reliance upon circumstantial evidence equated
to a dependence on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that because res ipsa was not pled or asserted,
32
it was waived by Naquin, and could not be the basis for establishing negligence. The court rejected
33
this theory , noting that EBI was the only party responsible for the "indisputably defective" weld that
34
secured the crane to its base. As such, it was the direct cause of Naquin's injuries and, although
circumstantial, the court held such evidence was sufficient to support the jury ' s finding that EBI was
35
negligent.
EBI ' s third argument o n appeal related t o the admission of evidence concerning the death o f
Naquin' s cousin ' s husband, because i t argued such evidence was not relevant t o Naquin' s claim for
emotional damages. 36 The court began its inquiry by noting that the "Jones Act does not
indiscriminately permit compensation for emotional damages resulting from the death of another
37
38
person." The court continued by acknowledging that in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshal/ , the
Supreme Court held the "appropriate test for awarding emotional damages under the FELA-and by
extension, the Jones Act-is whether the plaintiff was in the 'zone of danger.' " 39 The court found
that, unquestionably, Naquin was in the zone of danger and eligible for damages relating to his
40
emotional harm. However, the court noted that there was no case law to support Naquin's argument
that a Jones Act plaintiff, "once physically inj ured and entitled to emotional damages, is entitled to the
41
ful l spectrum of emotional damages, including those arising from an injury to someone else." The
court cited to the Supreme Court' s discussion in Gottshall, finding that the Court' s explicit rejection of
the relative bystander test's applicability under the Jones Act was instructive for determining whether
42
Naquin could assert a claim for emotional harm arising from an injury to his relative. The court also
noted "the Jones Act only extended an action to recover for the death of a seaman to his immediate

27 /d.
28 !d.
29 /d. at 936.
30 !d.
31 /d. at 936-37.
32 /d. at 937.
33 The court noted it had already considered and rejected this argument, referencing its opinion in Watz v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 431 F.2d I 00 (5th Cir. 1970). /d. There, the court rejected the theory stating"[w ]e simply apply a rule of
circumstantial evidence, not changing the burden of proof or casting presumptions against the defendant." /d. at 119.

34 Naquin, 744 F.3d at 937.
35 !d.
36 /d. at 938. The district court denied EB1' s motion to exclude any references to the relative's death, concluding that
although prejudicial the evidence was relevant to Naquin's emotional damages claim. /d.
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38 512 U.S. 532 (1994).
39 Naquin, 744 F.3d at 938 (quoting Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555-556).
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/d.

4 1 /d. at 939.
42 !d. at 938-39.

3

family."43 The court therefore found it would be inconsistent with the wrongful death provisions of the
Jones Act if anyone other than immediate family were allowed to recover for the negligent death of a
coworker. 44 Lastly, the court referenced its prior decision in Gaston v. Flowers Transportation45.46
There, the court rejected an emotional damage c laim by a Jones Act plaintiff who watched his half
brother get crushed to death but was not injured himsel f. 47 There, the court concluded that there was
no merit in "allowing mere crewmen-bystanders to recover for witnessing the misfortune of another."48
Accordingly, here, the court held that its prior decision in Gaston and the Supreme Court's
decision in Gottshall compel its conclusion "that emotional damages resulting purely from another
49
person's injury, and not a fear of injury to one's self, are not compensable under the Jones Act." The
50
court held this to be true even when the plaintiff has also been injured. To extend damages for the
observations of a "bad sight," even when a family member is involved, would contravene the zone of
danger test's intention to only compensate for physical dangers. 5 1 Therefore, the court held that
Naquin was not entitled to emotional damages arising from the death of his relative under the Jones
Act, and that any evidence regarding such damages should have been excluded at trial. 52 However, the
court, unable to discern the amount of damages the jury awarded for the non-compensable harm caused
by the relative's death, found the jury's award to be too tainted, and ordered the award to be vacated. 53
The Fifth C ircuit thereby affirmed the judgment of the district court relating to seaman's status
and liability, but vacated the judgment relating to damages and remanded for further proceedings on
the issue of damages. 54
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